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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Igor Borbot, a native and citizen of Russia, has been 
detained at the Hudson County Correctional Facility pending 
removal proceedings since April 2016. Fourteen months after 
he was denied release on bond, Borbot petitioned the United 
States District Court for the District of New Jersey for a writ 
of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Borbot alleged that 
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment entitled him 
to a new bond hearing at which the government would bear 
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the burden of justifying his continued detention. The District 
Court dismissed Borbot’s petition, and he filed this appeal.  
I 
 Borbot entered the United States in September 2014 on 
a six-month tourist visa, which he overstayed. Nearly a year 
later, an Interpol Red Notice requested by Russia identified 
Borbot as a fugitive wanted for prosecution on criminal fraud 
charges. On April 22, 2016, Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) detained Borbot under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) 
and initiated removal proceedings, which are still pending in 
immigration court in New York.  
Section 1226(a) provides that “[o]n a warrant issued 
by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and 
detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be 
removed from the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). The 
relevant implementing regulations state that a detainee under 
§ 1226(a) may be released on bond by ICE or by an 
immigration judge (IJ) if the detainee “demonstrate[s] . . . that 
such release would not pose a danger to property or persons, 
and that [he] is likely to appear for any future proceeding.” 8 
C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8). If denied release at the initial bond 
hearing, a § 1226(a) detainee may request a custody 
redetermination hearing before an IJ. Id. § 236.1(d)(1). That 
request will “be considered only upon a showing that the 
alien’s circumstances have changed materially.” Id. 
§ 1003.19(e). Both the initial bond determination and 
subsequent custody decisions can be appealed to the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA). Id. § 236.1(d)(3). 
Shortly after his arrest, Borbot applied for release on 
bond. An IJ denied his application after a hearing, finding that 
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Borbot failed to meet his “burden in establishing [that] he 
does not pose a risk of danger to property.” App. 80 (citing 
Matter of Urena, 25 I & N Dec. 140, 141 (BIA 2009)). 
Borbot appealed the IJ’s decision to the BIA, arguing that the 
IJ “gave too much weight to his pending criminal charges in 
Russia” and that the charges were pretextual and “lodged in 
retaliation for [Borbot’s] political opposition to . . . Vladimir 
Putin.” App. 76. The BIA upheld the IJ’s decision, explaining 
that “an alien in bond proceedings is not entitled to the benefit 
of the doubt when it comes to evidence of potential 
dangerousness.” Id. Borbot later requested a redetermination 
hearing, which the IJ denied on April 13, 2017, finding that 
there had been no material change in circumstances.  
 About three months later, Borbot filed in the District 
Court a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2241, alleging that his continued detention deprived him of 
due process unless the government could show “clear and 
convincing evidence of risk of flight or danger to the 
community.” App. 24 (citations omitted). On July 19, 2017, 
nearly 15 months after Borbot’s arrest, the District Court 
dismissed his petition as facially insufficient, concluding that 
Borbot was not entitled to a new bond hearing unless he could 
show that he was denied due process in his initial hearing, 
which he did not attempt to do. Borbot timely appealed.1   
                                                 
1 The District Court also dismissed two other claims in 
Borbot’s petition, one challenging the IJ’s weighing of 
evidence and the other alleging that Borbot’s continued 
detention prevented him from communicating with his 
attorneys in Russia. Borbot does not appeal the dismissal of 
those claims.  
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II 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2241. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
Because the District Court dismissed Borbot’s petition 
without holding an evidentiary hearing, our review is plenary. 
See Fahy v. Horn, 516 F.3d 169, 179 (3d Cir. 2008); see also 
Ezeagwuna v. Ashcroft, 325 F.3d 396, 405 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(reviewing de novo whether an alien’s due process rights 
were violated).  
III 
 “[T]he Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process 
of law in deportation proceedings.” Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 
292, 306 (1993). The Supreme Court has repeatedly 
recognized that “[i]n the exercise of its broad power over 
naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly makes 
rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.” 
Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 521 (2003) (citation omitted). 
At the same time, the Court has found limits on that power. 
See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) 
(concluding that “[a] statute permitting indefinite detention of 
an alien would raise a serious constitutional problem”).  
The duration of Borbot’s detention is the sole basis for 
his due process challenge. According to Borbot, the 
government cannot constitutionally detain him “for over a 
year, or indefinitely[,] without having to prove 
dangerousness.” Borbot Br. 3. He acknowledges that—as 
mandated by Congress and the Department of Homeland 
Security—he has received a bond hearing and an opportunity 
to request a redetermination hearing based on changed 
circumstances. He does not challenge the adequacy of his 
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initial bond hearing. Nor does he allege unreasonable delay 
by the government. Indeed, the conclusion of his removal 
proceedings—and accordingly the end of his detention—
appears to be forthcoming.2 Rather, he argues that by the time 
the IJ denied his request for a redetermination hearing, about 
a year into his detention, he was entitled to a second bond 
hearing, this time with the government bearing the burden of 
proof. But Borbot cites no authority, and we can find none, to 
suggest that duration alone can sustain a due process 
challenge by a detainee who has been afforded the process 
contemplated by § 1226(a) and its implementing regulations.3   
                                                 
2 As Borbot’s counsel noted during oral argument, the 
immigration court has already held two merits hearings in his 
removal case. 
3 Borbot’s bond hearing and the lack of any allegation 
of unreasonable government delay distinguish his detention 
from the situation contemplated by Justice Kennedy in his 
concurring opinion in Demore, on which Borbot relies. In that 
case, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of 
mandatory detention without a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1226(c). Justice Kennedy understood the Supreme Court’s 
opinion to be consistent with the proposition that due process 
“could” entitle an alien detainee to “an individualized 
determination as to his risk of flight and dangerousness if the 
continued detention became unreasonable or unjustified.” 
Demore, 538 U.S. at 532 (Kennedy, J., concurring). In the 
event of “unreasonable delay” by the government, Justice 
Kennedy wrote, “it could become necessary . . . to inquire 
whether the detention is not to facilitate deportation, or to 
protect against risk of flight or dangerousness, but to 
incarcerate for other reasons.” Id. at 532–33. Borbot does not 
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 Instead, Borbot draws an analogy between his 
detention and mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). 
In particular, he relies on two cases in which this Court held 
that aliens detained under § 1226(c) were entitled to a bond 
hearing if their detention became unreasonably long: Diop v. 
ICE/Homeland Sec., 656 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 2011) and Chavez-
Alvarez v. Warden York Cty. Prison, 783 F.3d 469 (3d Cir. 
2015). Because of the differences between mandatory 
detention under § 1226(c) and detention under § 1226(a), 
however, Borbot’s analogy is inapt.  
 In contrast to the bond hearing and subsequent process 
afforded to § 1226(a) detainees like Borbot, Congress in 
§ 1226(c) defined certain categories of aliens for whom 
detention is mandatory and release is authorized only in 
narrow circumstances. Under § 1226(c), “[t]he Attorney 
General shall take into custody any alien” who is inadmissible 
or deportable on the basis of enumerated categories of crimes 
and terrorist activities. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1). By its terms, 
§ 1226(c) does not entitle detainees to a bond hearing. 
Release is authorized “only if the Attorney General 
decides . . . that release of the alien from custody is 
necessary” for witness-protection purposes “and the alien 
satisfies the Attorney General that the alien will not pose a 
danger to the safety of other persons or of property and is 
likely to appear for any scheduled proceeding.” Id. 
§ 1226(c)(2).  
                                                                                                             
attempt to show unreasonable delay, and unlike the petitioner 
in Demore, he has received an individualized determination 
as to the necessity of his detention. 
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 In Diop, we considered whether a petitioner was 
entitled to a bond hearing nearly three years into his detention 
under § 1226(c). 656 F.3d at 223–26. We held that he was, 
notwithstanding that provision’s lack of any such 
requirement. “[W]hen detention becomes unreasonable,” we 
reasoned, “the Due Process Clause demands a hearing, at 
which the Government bears the burden of proving that 
continued detention is necessary to fulfill the purposes of the 
detention statute.” Id. at 233. We noted that in rejecting a due 
process challenge by a § 1226(c) detainee in Demore, the 
Supreme Court emphasized that “mandatory detention 
pursuant to § 1226(c) lasts only for a ‘very limited time’ in 
the vast majority of cases,” and concluded that the result in 
that case “may well have been different” if the petitioner’s 
detention had been “significantly longer than the average.” 
Diop, 656 F.3d at 233–34 (quoting Demore, 538 U.S. at 529 
& n.12). We therefore interpreted § 1226(c) to “contain[] an 
implicit limitation of reasonableness: the statute authorizes 
only mandatory detention that is reasonable in length.” Id. at 
235. Beyond that point—which can be determined only by a 
“fact-dependent inquiry,” id. at 233—the statute “yields to the 
constitutional requirement that there be a further, 
individualized, inquiry into whether continued detention is 
necessary to carry out the statute’s purpose,” id. at 235. Our 
interpretation of § 1226(c) relied in part on Zadvydas, in 
which the Supreme Court “read an implicit limitation into” 8 
U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6)—which governs detention of aliens who 
have already been ordered removed—so that it “d[id] not 
permit indefinite detention.” 533 U.S. at 689.  
We applied Diop’s reasonableness requirement in 
Chavez-Alvarez. There, we held that because the petitioner’s 
year-long detention under § 1226(c) had become 
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unreasonable, he was entitled to a bond hearing where the 
government would bear the burden of “produc[ing] 
individualized evidence that Chavez–Alvarez’s continued 
detention was or is necessary.” Chavez-Alvarez, 783 F.3d at 
474, 478. As in Diop, that conclusion resulted from our “use 
of a balancing framework [that] makes any determination on 
reasonableness highly fact-specific.” Id. at 474.  
The Supreme Court recently overruled Diop’s 
interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). In Jennings v. 
Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018), the Court rejected our 
conclusion that § 1226(c) contains an implicit reasonableness 
limitation. Id. at 846–47. The Court noted that in Demore, it 
distinguished § 1226(c) from § 1231(a)(6) (the statute at issue 
in Zadvydas). Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 846. While detention 
under § 1231(a)(6) lacks a “definite termination point,” 
§ 1226(c) authorizes detention only until the conclusion of 
removal proceedings. Id. (quoting Demore, 538 U.S. at 529). 
The Court held in Jennings that “§ 1226(c) mandates 
detention of any alien falling within its scope and that 
detention may end prior to the conclusion of removal 
proceedings only if the alien is released for witness-protection 
purposes.” Id. at 847 (emphasis added) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). Jennings did not, however, address the 
constitutionality of § 1226(c), instead remanding to the Ninth 
Circuit to decide that question in the first instance. Id. at 851. 
Accordingly, Jennings did not call into question our 
constitutional holding in Diop that detention under § 1226(c) 
may violate due process if unreasonably long.  
Contrary to Borbot’s suggestion, however, the 
reasonableness inquiry we performed in Diop and Chavez-
Alvarez is inappropriate in the context of § 1226(a). We held 
in those cases that due process entitles § 1226(c) detainees to 
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a bond hearing at some point, with the exact time varying 
with the facts of the case. As noted, however, Borbot was 
afforded a prompt bond hearing, as required by § 1226(a) and 
its implementing regulations. He appealed the rejection of his 
application for release to the BIA and was given an 
opportunity to obtain a redetermination hearing if he could 
show materially changed circumstances. Unlike § 1226(c) 
detainees such as Diop and Chavez-Alvarez, who were 
detained for prolonged periods without being given any 
opportunity to apply for release on bond, Borbot was granted 
meaningful process prior to filing his habeas petition.4 
                                                 
4 Borbot notes that in Diop, we read Justice Kennedy’s 
concurrence in Demore to suggest that “even if an alien is 
given an initial hearing, his detention might still violate the 
Due Process Clause” if it becomes unreasonably long. 656 
F.3d at 232. The “initial hearing” at issue in those § 1226(c) 
cases, however, was not a bond hearing, but rather the Joseph 
hearing at which § 1226(c) detainees are permitted to 
demonstrate that they are not subject to mandatory detention. 
See Diop, 656 F.3d at 232; see also Demore, 538 U.S. at 532 
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Matter of Joseph, 22 I. & N. 
Dec. 799 (BIA 1999)). Justice Kennedy’s suggestion that 
there may be due process limits on detention under § 1226(c) 
even after a Joseph hearing does not apply to § 1226(a) 
detentions following a bond hearing. Whereas a Joseph 
hearing is unrelated to the detention itself—it is limited to 
whether § 1226(c) applies at all, see Matter of Joseph, 22 I. & 
N. Dec. at 800—the bond hearing Borbot received and the 
IJ’s consideration of his request for a redetermination hearing 
were expressly for the purpose of determining whether his 
continued detention was necessary.  
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Borbot complains that he has borne the burden of 
proof throughout his detention. The burden must eventually 
shift to the government, he argues, regardless of the process 
he was initially afforded under § 1226(a). Borbot is correct to 
point out that Diop places the burden of proof on the 
government in § 1226(c) cases, whereas under § 1226(a) the 
burden remains on the detainee at all times. But we perceive 
no problem with this distinction. Borbot claims the 
government could avoid ever bearing the burden of proof by 
“simply detain[ing] criminal aliens” pursuant to § 1226(a) 
even though they are subject to mandatory detention under 
§ 1226(c). Borbot Br. 10. We do not share this concern, 
because § 1226 affords the government no such discretion. 
See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (providing that “[t]he Attorney 
General shall take into custody any alien” who falls under 
certain enumerated categories (emphasis added)). Nor does 
the distinction run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause, as 
Borbot suggests, because § 1226(a) detainees are not situated 
similarly to § 1226(c) detainees, much less to § 1226(c) 
detainees who have been detained for years without any 
opportunity to show why they should be released.  
The distinction we draw today between § 1226(a) and 
§ 1226(c) detainees is further supported by the statutory 
scheme applicable to removal. Section 1226(e) provides that 
“[t]he Attorney General’s discretionary judgment regarding 
[bond hearings for aliens in removal proceedings] shall not be 
subject to review” and that “[n]o court may set aside any 
action or decision by the Attorney General under this section 
regarding the detention or release of any alien or the grant, 
revocation, or denial of bond or parole.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e). 
Because Borbot does not challenge a particular action or 
decision, but rather “the statutory framework that permits his 
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detention without bail,” Demore, 538 U.S. at 517, § 1226(e) 
does not deprive the District Court or this Court of 
jurisdiction over Borbot’s petition. But unlike the § 1226(c) 
context, in which a habeas petition seeks to compel a bond 
hearing where there has been none, Borbot’s habeas petition 
seeks to compel a second bond hearing despite alleging no 
constitutional defect in the one he received. This comes close 
to asking this Court to directly review the IJ’s bond decision, 
a task Congress has expressly forbidden us from 
undertaking.5 
We recognize Borbot’s concern that, despite an initial 
bond hearing, detention under § 1226(a) might become 
unreasonably prolonged, whether by virtue of government 
delay or some other cause. But Borbot fails to identify a basis 
in the record to demonstrate that this is such a case. We 
therefore need not decide when, if ever, the Due Process 
Clause might entitle an alien detained under § 1226(a) to a 
                                                 
5 Although Borbot’s argument is constitutional rather 
than statutory, we note that the Supreme Court in Jennings 
rejected an interpretation of § 1226(a) that included implicit 
time limits and a shifting burden of proof. See 138 S. Ct. at 
847–48 (“Nothing in § 1226(a)’s text—which says only that 
the Attorney General ‘may release’ the alien ‘on . . . bond’—
even remotely supports the imposition of those requirements. 
Nor does § 1226(a)’s text even hint that the length of 
detention prior to a bond hearing must specifically be 
considered in determining whether the alien should be 
released.” (ellipsis in original)). 
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new bond hearing in order to conclude that Borbot’s due 
process rights were not violated.6  
* * * 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s order. 
                                                 
6 By letter dated September 7, 2018, counsel for 
Borbot advised this Court that as of July 20, 2018, Borbot “is 
not subject to an INTERPOL Notice or diffusion.” Nothing in 
this Opinion should be read to preclude Borbot from seeking 
reconsideration from the agency based on these changed 
circumstances.  
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 ROTH, Senior Judge, dissenting: 
 The judicial branch of our federal government should 
be sheltered from the political maneuverings of foreign 
nations.  These matters are best left to the executive and 
legislative branches.  Nevertheless, there are occasions when 
it becomes evident that the machinations of a foreign 
government have, inadvertently to the courts, become 
entangled in the judicial process. 
 
 This case is an example of such a situation.  It has 
become clear that the Russian government has been 
employing Interpol alerts or “Red Notices” to pursue and 
harass opponents of the Russian regime.  See, e.g., The 
Atlantic, July 30, 2018; The Atlantic, May 30, 2018; The New 
York Times, November 6, 2016; The Globe and Mail, 
September 25, 2015.  A member country of Interpol, such as 
Russia, can request that Interpol issue an arrest warrant to aid 
in capturing a fugitive.  Interpol will then issue a Red Notice 
and, on the basis of that notice, the fugitive can be arrested by 
the authorities in another member country where the fugitive 
may be located.  This is designed to be an important tool in 
fighting crime.  It is a tool, however, that has been 
misappropriated by the Russian government to punish 
political opponents who travel abroad.   
 
 Opponents of the present Russian regime have been 
arrested in countries around the world on the basis of a Red 
Notice.  They then have had extreme difficulty in convincing 
the authorities of the arresting countries that they are not 
criminals but are being pursued by the Russian government 
for political reasons. 
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 The petitioner here claims that he is not a criminal.  He 
has no criminal record anywhere.  He was arrested by ICE for 
overstaying his visa.  Then, on the basis of an Interpol Red 
Notice, requested by Russia, he has been held in custody 
since April 22, 2016, on the ground that he is a danger to the 
community.  The reason for being classified as a danger is the 
Red Notice, nothing else.  We have just learned that as of July 
28, 2018, Interpol withdrew the Red Notice on Borbot.  
Nevertheless, Borbot remains in custody at least until there is 
a new ruling on danger to the community by the BIA. 
 
 To obtain the Red Notice, Russia charged Borbot with 
fraud.  Borbot has demonstrated that the “fraud,” an alleged 
overcharging on a shipyard construction contract, was 
baseless and politically motivated.  He has applied for 
political asylum.  Moreover, there was a civil suit brought 
against Borbot in a Russian court on the basis of the same 
shipyard overcharges.  The suit was dismissed as groundless 
and the dismissal was affirmed. 
 
 It is contrary to my concept of justice to hold in 
custody an individual who is the innocent victim of a rogue 
foreign government.  For that reason, I would recommend 
that a new hearing be held by the IJ to review the finding of 
“danger to the community.”  Such a review is necessary to 
prevent a foreign government from improperly influencing 
our immigration courts. 
